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EVALUATING BANK COMMERCIAL PAPER
PLACEMENT ACTIVITY UNDER THE
GLASS-STEAGALL ACT
The Glass-Steagall Act' ("The Act") generally prohibits commercial
banks from engaging in investment banking activities.2 In response to
the recent growth of the financial services market, however, commercial
banks have begun to offer services which traditionally the investment
banking sector only offered.3 For example, banks now participate in the
commercial paper market. Understandably, the investment banking in-
dustry has complained about this activity.4 The industry has argued that
the Act prohibits any bank involvement in the commercial paper
market.5
The Act prohibits banks from underwriting securities.6 Although in
Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors (Bankers Trust) the
Supreme Court concluded that commercial paper was a security for pur-
poses of Glass-Steagall,7 it has not ruled whether any bank involvement
in the commercial paper market constitutes a "per se" violation of the
1. The Banking Act of 1933 (The Glass-Steagall Act), 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1982), 12
U.S.C. § 378(a)(1) (1982) [hereinafter The Act].
2. 5 Di LORENZO, BANKING LAW, § 96.02 (MB 1986). Commercial banking involves receiv-
ing deposits and making loans on personal security. Investment banks may not accept deposits, but
may engage in underwriting, issuing and dealing in securities. See Note, A Construction of Glass-
Steagall's Securities Provisions: Clearing the Confusion of the Federal Reserve System, 5 ANN. REV.
BANK. L. 307 at n.5 (1986) [hereinafter Note, A Construction of Glass-Steagall].
3. For a discussion of the details of the commercial paper market, see Hurley, The Commer-
cial Paper Market, 63 FED. REs. BULL. 525 (June 1977); Note, The Commercial Paper Market and
the Securities Acts, 39 U. CH. L. REV. 362 (1972) [hereinafter Note, The Commercial Paper Mar-
ket]. See also infra notes 9-22 and accompanying text (general discussion of the nature and growth
of commercial paper market).
4. A.G. Becker Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., 519 F. Supp. 602 (D.D.C.
1981); 693 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Securities Indus. Ass'n. v. Board of Governors of the Fed.
Res. Sys., 104 S. Ct. 2979 (1984) (Bankers Trust). See infra notes 73-109 and accompanying text for
the case history of Bankers Trust.
5. See infra notes 73-109 and accompanying text.
6. Di LORENZO, supra note 2, at § 96.02(1).
7. 104 S. Ct. 2979, 2987 (1984). This was a 6-3 decision. This dissent said that commercial
paper did not constitute a "security" for the purposes of the Act. This author agrees with the
Court's holding that commercial paper is a security for the purposes of the Act. For criticism of the
Court's holding, see Note, Security Under the Glass-Steagall Act: Analyzing the Supreme Court's
Framework for Determining Permissible Bank Activity, 70 CORNELL L.R. 1194, 1195, 1206-12
(1985); Case Note, Banking Law: Commercial Paper Is a Security Under The Glass-Steagall Act,
1985 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 799, 809-21.
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Act's prohibition against underwriting. 8 This Note concludes that lim-
ited bank involvement in commercial paper placement is permitted under
the Act. This limited involvement is consistent with a literal reading of
the Act and does not implicate the concerns expressed in the legislative
history and subsequent judicial interpretations of the Act.
Specifically, Part One of this Note focuses on the nature and growth of
the commercial paper market. Part Two discusses the history behind the
Act and the statutory framework necessary to evaluate bank activity in
the commercial paper market. Part Three examines court decisions in-
volving the relevant sections of the Act. Part Four proposes guidelines
for evaluating bank activity in the commercial paper market.
I. THE NATURE AND GROWTH OF THE COMMERCIAL
PAPER MARKET
Commercial paper consists of unsecured short-term promissory notes
which corporations issue to investors either directly or through dealers.9
The notes are payable to the bearer on a stated maturity date.'" While
the maturity period ranges from one day to nine months, most notes have
initial maturities of 60 days or less." The minimum denomination of
commercial paper is usually $100,000.12 Most issuers of commercial pa-
per are large, financially-stable corporations. Due to the overall financial
stability of the issuers, these notes are considered relatively risk free. 13
Corporations predominantly use commercial paper proceeds to finance
well-defined current operational expenditures. Over the past fifteen
years, an increasing number of large corporations have issued commer-
cial paper instead of assuming bank loans to meet short-term credit
needs. " Some issuers maintain stand-by letters-of-credit at banks, which
guarantee that the bank will repay the notes at maturity should the issuer
8. 104 S. Ct. at 2991 n.12. Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, expressed no opinion
whether the commercial paper activity in question constitutes "underwriting" within § 16 of the
Act, or the "business of issuing, underwriting, selling or distribtiting" within § 21 of the Act. Id.
9. Hurley, supra note 3, at 525.
10. Note, The Commercial Paper Market, supra note 3, at 363-64.
11. Hurley, supra note 3, at 525.
12. Di LORENZO, supra note 2, at § 93.13(1).
13. Note, The Commercial Paper Market, supra note 3, at 364. But see Hurley, supra note 3, at
532-35 (On June 21, 1970, the Penn Central Transportation Company filed for bankruptcy. Penn
Central was the nation's largest railroad and sixth largest nonfinancial corporation. When it filed for
bankruptcy, it had $82 million of commecial paper outstanding. The company's default placed a
serious stress on the commercial paper market. The market improved by the mid-1970's.).
14. Hurley, supra note 3, at 525.
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fail. 15
Dealers and brokers sell a substantial portion of the commercial pa-
per. t6 This enables the issuer to realize a monetary savings, since the
dealers and brokers have a pre-existing distribution network.17 Dealers
act as the principal, buying the commercial paper from the issuer and
assuming the risk of the market fluctuations."i On the other hand, bro-
kers act as agents, merely handling the selling arrangements without
purchasing the paper."
Purchasers of commercial paper primarily include institutional inves-
tors like insurance companies, pension funds, nonfinancial corporations,
and bank trust departments.20 The volume of outstanding commercial
paper increased fourfold over the past decade, with over $200 billion cur-
rently outstanding.2" The number of issuers nearly doubled during this
same period.22
II. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
A. The History of the Glass-Steagall Act
Banking in the United States initially followed the English model
which separated commercial banking from investment banking.23 The
evolution of the trust company, however, changed the system. Organ-
ized under general incorporation laws, trust companies pursued all types
of business activity. They offered complete financial services in both
commercial and investment banking. Banks protested the intrusion of
15. DI LORENZO, supra note 2, at § 96.13(1). The letter-of-credit is used by many smaller or
lesser-known issuers. The letter-of-credit helps the sale of the issue by substituting the bank's repu-
tation for the issuer's reputation.
16. Id. Dealers and brokers usually charge a fee of one-eighth of one percent of the total issue.
Dealers and brokers currently place approximately 40 percent of all outstanding paper. Note, A
Construction of Glass-Steagall, supra note 2, at 309.
17. Hurley, supra note 2, at 526. Direct placement is uneconomical unless the issuer's average
monthly volume outstanding exceeds $100 million. Id.
18. See DI LORENZO, supra note 2, at § 96.13(1).
19. Id. This agency activity is sometimes known as a "best-efforts" arrangement. Id.
20. Hurley, supra note 3, at 525.
21. HUBER, BANK OFFICER'S HANDBOOK OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION, § 12.04(8) (1987
Supp.).
22. Id.; see also Federal Reserve Board Statement, reprinted in, FED. BANKING L. REP.,
(CCH), 86,270, at pp. 90,835 (1984-85) (There are currently 1,200 commercial paper issuers.).
23. HUBER, BANK OFFICER'S HANDBOOK OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION, § 12.02(1) (1984).
See also Perkins, The Divorce of Commercial and Investment Banking: A History, 88 BANK. L.J. 483,
486 (1971) (By the late 19th century, London was the world's leading financial center. American
bankers followed the English system.).
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trust companies into commercial banking areas, and, in turn, received
tacit approval to enter into investment banking activities. 24 Banks re-
ceived formal Congressional approval for their securities activities in the
McFadden Act in 1927.25 This act authorized banks directly to under-
write investment securities provided that the amount of securities of any
single issuer did not exceed twenty-five percent of the bank's capital.26
By 1929, banks had become the dominant force in investment banking.
Within four years, though, over 10,000 banks folded.27 After the stock
market crash of October 1929, Congress feared that bank involvement in
speculative securities activities had damaged the industry. Hearings on
proposed legislation to curtail banks' securities activities exposed ques-
tionable and unsound practice. Among the practices that threatened the
safety of depositors' funds and the overall strength of the banking system
were:
1) Bank-established subsidiaries whose profitability depended on the vol-
ume of securities sales, a practice which gave the banks incentives to make
unsound loans to prospective purchasers;28
2) bad loans transferred to securities affiliates;2 9
3) banks devoting extensive resources to promote underwriting activities; 30
4) bank support of their own stock by directing securities affiliates to
purchase the bank's stock;31
5) unsound and under-collateralized loans to securities affiliates with finan-
cial problems.3 2
Congress feared that banks were using deposits to finance speculative in-
vestments.3 Also, public confidence in banks had dropped, because of
the apparent risks associated with banks' securities activities.34 At the
24. For a general discussion of the emergence of trust companies and the effect on commercial
banking, see Di LORENZO, supra note 2, at § 96.02(1).
25. The McFadden Act, ch. 191, 44 Stat. 1224 (1927). The McFadden Act, in its original form,
recognized national banks' securities affiliates and gave the Comptroller of the Currency a role in
regulating securities affiliates. Perkins, supra note 23, at 494 n.27. The current version of the Mc-
Fadden Act, 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1982), regulates national banks' branching powers.
26. DI LORENZO, supra note 2, at § 96.02(1); HUBER, supra note 23 at § 12.02(1).
27. Id. at § 2.06. Most banks simply failed, although a limited number were absorbed through
consolidation or merger. Id.
28. Di LORENZO, supra note 2, at § 96.02(l); HUBER, supra note 23 at § 12.02(2).
29. Di LORENZO, supra note 2, at § 96.02(1).
30. HUBER, supra note 23, at § 12.02(2).
31. Id.; Di LORENZO, supra note 2, at § 96.02(1).
32. HUBER, supra note 23, at § 12.02(2).
33. Di LORENZO, supra note 2, at § 96.02(1).
34. Id. Senator Bulkley was extremely skeptical of banks' securities affiliates. "[A]lthough such
a loss would possibly not result in any substantial impairment of the resources of the banking institu-
[Vol. 65:615
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same time banks faced a conflict of interest in that they possessed a duty
to offer impartial investment advice, while on the other hand desiring to
promote their own securities activities.35 Congress adopted the Glass-
Steagall Act in response to these perceived problems.
Congress faced a key policy choice of whether completely to prohibit
banks from engaging in investment banking activities or merely to regu-
late the potential abuses attendant to banks' securities activities. Con-
gress chose the former because it felt that bank involvement in the
promotion of securities was inconsistent with the best interest of banks.36
Moreover, Congress believed that total separation of commercial banking
and investment banking would restore public confidence in the banking
system.37
B. The Relevant Provisions of Glass-Steagall
The Act contains four provisions relating to banks' securities activi-
ties.38 Sections 16 and 21 apply to banks, while Sections 20 and 32 apply
to bank affiliates.39 While Section 16 limits banks' securities activities,
tion owning that affiliate... there can be no doubt that the whole transaction tends to discredit the
bank and impair the confidence of its depositors." 75 CONG. REC. 9912 (1932).
35. Id. Consider the remarks of Senator Bulkley: "[T]he banker who has nothing to sell to his
depositors is much better qualified to advise disinterestedly... than the banker who uses the list of
depositors ... to distribute circulars concerning this, that or the other investment on which the bank
is to receive ... profit .. " Id.
36. Id. (remarks of Senator Bulkley); HUBER, supra note 23, at § 12.03(1); Board of Governors
of the Fed. Res. Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 62 (1981).
37. 75 CONG. REC. 9912 (1932) (remarks of Senator Bulkley). See also Note, A Construction of
Glass-Steagall, supra note 2, at 313-14 (Senator Glass thought that banks' securities activities had
contributed to the Great Depression. He and Representative Steagall felt that depositors feared that
banks' securities activities jeopardized their deposits. This caused large scale withdrawals.).
38. HUBER, supra note 23, at § 12.03(2). For a historical discussion of the legislative hearings
and the influences behind the adoption of the Act, see Perkins, supra note 23, at 483, 497-528 (Pro-
fessor Perkins examines the legislative debates, the compromises and the prevailing social views on
the role of commercial banks.).
39. The scope of this paper is limited to banks' activities, which are covered by Sections 16 and
21. Sections 20 and 32 apply to bank affiliates. Section 20 of the Act, 12 U.S.C. § 377, prohibits
affiliates of member banks from being "engaged in the issue, floatation, underwriting, public sale, or
distribution of securities." Section 32 of the Act, 12 U.S.C. § 78 prohibits member banks from
having director, officer, or employee interlocks with companies "primarily engaged" in the securities
business.
Federal regulation divides commercial banks into three categories. Banks that choose to become
members of the Federal Reserve System fall under the jurisdiction of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System. National banks are within the jurisdiction of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency. Insured state banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System are under the juris-
diction of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. The FDIC insures the deposits of all three
1987]
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Section 21 prohibits investment banking firms from engaging in commer-
cial banking activity."
These sections address two principle areas of bank activity: bank un-
derwriting of securities and bank purchases of securities for their custom-
ers' accounts.41 Section 16 generally prohibits banks from underwriting
securities. This provision prohibits underwriting in two ways. First, it
forbids banks from purchasing securities from issuers with the intent to
distribute to investors. Second, it outlaws arrangements where the issuer
attempts a public distribution of securities while the bank agrees to
purchase any unsold securities at a specified price.42 The Act's prohibi-
tion of these underwriting activities does not apply to federal or state
obligations.43
categories, although it only regulates the third group. Investment Co. Institute v. FDIC, 815 F.2d
1540, 1542 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The Act seeks to draw a line between these three groups of commercial
banks and investment banks. Generally, the Act's restrictions apply to nationally-chartered banks,
Federal Reserve Member banks and non-member state banks under the FDIC. Di LORENZO, supra
note 2, at § 96.02(2)(a).
For an argument that Sections 20 and 32 are legislative loopholes for non-Federal Reserve System
commercial banks, see generally, Note, Avoiding the Glass-Steagall and Bank Holding Company
Acts: An Option For Bank Product Expansion, 59 IND. L.J 89 (state non-member banks may have
product expansion, including securities activities, through their affiliates).
40. Board of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys. v. Investment Co. Institute, 450 U.S. 46 (1981);
HUBER, supra note 23, at § 12.03(2). Section 16 provides in relevant part: the business of dealing in
securities and stock by the (national banking) association shall be limited to purchasing and selling
such securities and stock without recourse, solely upon the order, and for the account of customers
and in no case for its own account, and the association shall not underwrite any issue of stock or
securities. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1988).
Section 21(a)(1) complements Section 16 by providing that it is unlawful:
For any person, firm, corporation, association, business, trust or other similar organization,
engaged in the business of issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing, at wholesale or
retail, or through syndicate participation, stocks, bonds, debentures, notes or other securi-
ties, to engage at the same time to any extent whatever in the business of receiving
deposits....
12 U.S.C. § 378 (1988).
41. Section 16 also addresses a third area of activity: bank purchases of securities for its own
account. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1988).
42. Di LORENZO, supra note 2, at § 96.02(2) (citing the Comptroller of the Currency's Digest of
Opinions § 210 (1960), reprinted in 4 FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) q 49,202 at § .32).
43. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1988). Transactions concerning the following are permitted: Ob-
ligations of the Washington Metropolitan Transit Authority guaranteed under Section 9 of the Na-
tional Capital Transportation Act; obligations issued under the Federal Farm Loan Act, or the
thirteen banks for cooperatives or any of them or the Federal Home Loan Banks; obligations insured
under Title XI of the National Housing Act or under Section 1713 of Title 12 of the United States
Code; instruments of or issued by the Federal National Mortgage Association or Government Na-
tional Mortgage Association, or mortgages and obligations sold by the Federal Home Loan Mort-
gage Corporation under Sections 1454 or 1455 of Title 12; obligations of the Federal Financing Bank
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol65/iss3/5
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Section 16 also addresses banks that purchase securities on behalf of
their customers. The express language of this section permits banks to
purchase securities "solely upon the order, and for the account of cus-
tomers."'  Most commentators believe that this language permits banks
to continue to offer "agency-type" securities services to depositors. 45
Congress passed the Banking Act of 1935 in response to conflicting
interpretations of Section 16.46 This act amended Section 16 clearly to
permit both equity and debt transactions for customer accounts.47 The
Comptroller of the Currency testified before Congress that the amended
version of Section 16 merely clarified the Act because Section 16 never
prohibited banks from buying or selling securities for their customers'
accounts. 48 The Congressional committees concurred with the Comp-
troller's conclusion, because no bank funds would be invested in these
securities transactions.49
Section 21(a)(1) compliments Section 16 by prohibiting persons "en-
gaged in the business" of "issuing, underwriting, selling or distributing"
securities to engage "in the business of receiving deposits."5 The Bank-
ing Act of 1935 also amended this section to clarify that Section 21 did
not prohibit banks' dealing in, underwriting, purchasing, and selling se-
curities to the extent allowed in Section 16.51
or Environmental Financing Authority or Student Loan Marketing Association; certain obligations
of any local public agency secured by an agreement with the Secretary of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment, or a public housing agency whose obligations are secured as enumerated; obligations issued
by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Inter-American Development
Bank; obligations of the Tennessee Valley Authority and United States Postal Service; or obligations
issued by states and localities for housing, dormitory, or university purposes-within certain limits.
44. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1988).
45. Di LORENZO, supra note 2, at § 96.02(2); HUBER, supra note 21, at § 12.04(8) (citing the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency's position in 44 WASH. FIN. REP. 887 (1985)).
46. 1935 Banking Act, 49 Stat. 709, § 308(a).
47. Presently codified at 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1988); see supra note 40 and accompanying
text.
48. Hearing on H.R. 5357, Before the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. 663 (1935): "Section 307(a) .... makes it clear that Section 16... was not intended to prohibit
national banks or member banks from buying or selling stocks solely for the account of their custom-
ers." (Section 307 of the proposed bill became Section 308 of the act as passed.)
49. H.R. REP. No. 1948, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934), and S. REP. No. 1260, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 2 (1934).
50. 12 U.S.C. § 378 (1988). For the text of the section see supra note 40.
51. 49 Stat. 709 § 303(a), as codified at 12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(1) (1988). See H.R. REP. No. 742,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1935); S. REP. No. 10007, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1935); Securities Indus.
Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., 104 S. Ct. 2979 (1984) (Bankers Trust).
1987]
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C. Federal Securities Law Provisions
In addition to the Glass-Steagall Act, three federal securities law pro-
visions aid the analysis of bank activities in the commercial paper mar-
ket. First, Section 2(a)(11) of the Securities Act of 1933 (hereinafter
cited as Securities Act) defines "underwriter" as "any person who has
purchased from the issuer with a view to, or offers or sells for an issuer in
connection with, the distribution of any security."52 Under this statutory
scheme, an underwriter usually does not exist unless a "distribution" ex-
ists. Contemporaneous federal agency interpretation and subsequent
commentary suggested that a "distribution" is synonymous with a "pub-
lic offering."" Thus, an "underwriter" usually does not exist without a
"public offering."
The term "underwriter" is not clearly defined in the Glass-Steagall
Act. 4 Although the precise purposes of the Act and the Securities Act
may differ," these two reforms emerged from the same effort to restruc-
ture American financial markets and became law within three weeks of
each other. 6 Congress' use of the term "underwriter" under Glass-Stea-
gall probably indicates an underwriter exists only when a "public offer-
ing" of securities exists.
In the same vein, Section 3(a)(3) of the Securities Act exempts from
registration any security "which arises out of a current transaction...
52. 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(11) (1987).
53. The Federal Trade Commission, the agency originally charged with regulating the securi-
ties industry, said that a statutory distribution necessarily involved a public offering. H.R. CONr.
REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1934). See also 1 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 551 (2d
ed. 1961) ("distribution" is synonymous with "public offering").
However, an underwriter may exist in a secondary market transaction. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144
(1976) (Rule 144), which sets forth the circumstances under which affiliates or persons acquiring
shares from a company issued in reliance on the Regulation D exemption can sell such shares pub-
licly without being deemed a statutory underwriter. See generally BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES
LAW HANDBOOK 226-29 (1986-87 ed.).
54. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., 807 F.2d 1052, 1062
(D.C. Cir. 1986).
55. Compare Board of Governors of the Fed. Res. System v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46,
61 (1981) ("[T]he Glass-Steagall Act was enacted in 1933 to protect bank depositors from any repeti-
tion of the widespread bank closings that occurred in the Great Depression.") with United Housing
Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975) (The securities laws were passed "to prevent fraud
and to protect the interests of investors.").
56. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., 807 F.2d 1052, 1063
(D.C. Cir. 1986); see generally, HUBER, supra note 23, at § 2.06 (A "blizzard of statutes" was en-
acted in the first three months of President Roosevelt's administration. The Act and the Securities
Act of 1933 were among these statutes.).
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and which has a maturity at the time of issuance not exceeding nine
months."57 The Securities and Exchange Commission has stated that the
Section 3(a)(3) exemption applies only to obligations "of a type not ordi-
narily purchased by the general public."' Most commercial paper that
banks place qualifies for this exemption from registration.59
Finally, the Securities and Exchange Commission adopted Rule 3b-9
in 1985, which requires banks to conduct certain securities activities
through a broker-dealer registered under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. 0 Among other things, a bank must conduct "best-efforts" under-
writing through a registered broker-dealer subsidiary.6 However, Rule
3b-9(b) permits banks to continue commercial paper activities without
registering as broker-dealers.62
III. JUDICIAL AND AGENCY INTERPRETATIONS
OF GLASS-STEAGALL
Court interpretations of the Act are scarce. In Investment Company
Institute v. Camp the Supreme Court examined Sections 16 and 21.63
The Court focused on the policy objectivies of the Act. The Court stated
that Congress believed that the dangers of bank involvement in securities
57. 15 U.S.C. § 77(c)(a)(3) (1987).
58. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4412 (September 20, 1961). The Release provides four
criteria for determining whether commercial paper is exempt from registration under § 3(a)(3). The
paper must be (1) prime quality negotiable paper, (2) of a type not ordinarily purchased by the
general public, (3) used to finance well-defined current operational expenses, and (4) discountable at
a Federal Reserve bank. Id.
59. See generally Note, The Commercial Paper Market, supra note 3, at 380, 381-96 (Among
the parties who pushed for the 3(a)(3) exemption was the Federal Reserve Board.). See infra notes
94-99, 104-05 and accompanying text, for a discussion of the public offering/private offering
implications.
60. 50 FED. REG. 28385 (July 12, 1985). "These activities are (1) public solicitation of broker-
age business for transaction-related compensation, (2) receipt of transaction-related compensation
for providing brokerage services for trust, managing agency or other accounts to which the bank
provides advice or (3) dealing in or underwriting securities." Id.
61. Best-efforts underwriting occurs when the "securities house" sells the issue for the issuer as
an agent, rather than buying the issue from the issuer and reselling as a principal. In a best-efforts
underwriting, the "agent" takes its compensation in the form of a commission, rather than through
profit on the sale. RATNER, SECURrrIEs REGULATION 29 (3d ed.).
62. 50 FED. REG. 28391 (July 12, 1985). Under Rule 3b-9(b)(1), a bank may take part in
commercial paper transactions without broker-dealer registration. This exception reflects the SEC's
intent to avoid disruption of the existing statutory scheme. See also BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 53,
at p, cxvi (86-87 ed.). ("The issue of the extent to which banks may participate in the sale of com-
mercial paper without being deemed an underwriter remains an open one.... but the bank will not
be required to register as a broker-dealer."). Id.
63. 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
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activities outweighed the benefits.6r Thus Sections 16 and 21 prohibited
bank securities activity which implicated certain "subtle hazards". 65 The
"subtle hazards" included the danger:66
1) That banks would invest their assets in illiquid or speculative securities;
2) That public confidence would drop if bank securities activities resulted
in losses;
3) That issuer proceeds were used to pay back bank loans;
4) That banks would issue loans to facilitate the purchases of securities
which the bank had promoted;
5) That banks would extend credit more freely to issuers whose securities
the bank promoted;
6) That the bank's promotional interest conflicted with its obligation to of-
fer disinterested financial advice; and
7) That bank depositors would suffer losses on securities they purchased in
reliance on the relationship between the bank and the issuer.
Camp thus effectively reduced examination of bank securities activities
into two distinct steps.67 First, the courts scrutinize the activity under
the literal language of Sections 16 and 21. Second, they examine the
activity against the background purposes of the Act to see if they impli-
cate any of the "subtle hazards" that the Camp Court outlined.
Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors (Schwab)
presented an example of Supreme Court analysis under Section 16.68 In
Schwab, the Court found that brokerage or agency-type securities activi-
ties are permissable under Section 16.69 The Court distinguished the ac-
tivities of a broker, who merely executes orders for the purchase or sale
of a security as an agent, from the activities of an underwriter, who acts
64. Id. at 630.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 630-34.
67. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., 807 F.2d 1052, 1067
(D.C. Cir. 1986). After examining the bank activity under the literal language of Section 16, the
court said, "[tihe Supreme Court's Glass-Steagall Act cases uniformly consider 'subtle hazards'....
Until the Court indicates that it no longer employs this analysis to interpret the Glass-Steagall Act,
we too must take such considerations into account." Id.
68. 104 S. Ct. 3003 (1984).
69. Id. at 3010 n.20. "The permissive phrase found in Section 16 accurately describes securities
brokerage and clearly distinguishes that activity from the activities of 'dealing in, underwriting, and
purchasing for its own account investment securities that are prohibited elsewhere in that section."
Id. The Court said that banks have a long history of arranging the purchase and sale of securities as
an accommodation to their customers. The Court said that Congress endorsed this service when
enacting Section 16. Id. at 3008.
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as a principal and actually buys the securities from the issuer.7' The
Court found that the key distinction is that an underwriter assumes all
risk from possible market fluctuations, while in an agency-type transac-
tion, the issuer and the customer bear the risk of loss.7
The analysis of bank commercial paper placement under both the lit-
eral terms of the Act and its policy objectives has produced inconsistent
results. On the same day that it handed down Schwab the Supreme
Court decided a completely different case with the same name. For clar-
ity's sake this Note refers to this case as Bankers Trust. In Bankers
Trust72 the Bankers Trust Company had solicited commercial paper is-
suers to use the bank's selling services. The bank advised issuers about
rates and maturities of proposed issues. If the client wished to issue com-
mercial paper, Bankers Trust privately solicited institutional purchasers
and acted as the agent of the issuer by placing the paper. The bank did
not purchase the issue itself, but it did offer to lend issuers an amount of
money that equalled the value of paper being sold at a comparable inter-
est rate.
73
The Supreme Court failed to analyze Sections 16 and 21 completely
when it examined Bankers Trust's activities in the commercial paper
70. Id. at 3010.
71. Id. at 3010 n.18. But see Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Res.
Sys., 627 F. Supp. 695, 703 (D.D.C. 1986). The Bankers Trust court found a distinction between a
broker in the secondary market, as the party in Schwab was, and a bank which assisted in the initial
issuance of commercial paper. The typical broker's profit depends on the volume of securities sold.
However, a bank which placed commercial paper depends on the profitability of the particular issue
involved. Thus the court said that the bank had a "salesman's stake" in the paper it sold. Id. at 703.
For a general discussion of this court's analysis and holding, see infra notes 86-99 and accompanying
text.
72. The controversy began in January 1979. A national securities industry trade association
and a commercial paper dealer petitioned the Federal Reserve Board to prohibit Bankers Trust from
selling commercial paper. The petitioners alleged the activity violated the Act. In September 1980,
the Board responded by saying that the commercial paper being placed was not a security for the
purposes of the Act, and therefore, not subject to the Act's prohibitions.
In July 1981, the District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that commercial paper was a
security within the meaning of the Act. This court invalidated the Board's decision. A.G. Becker,
Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Res. Sys., 519 F. Supp. 602 (D.D.C. 1981). A divided
court of appeals reversed that decision, adopting the Board's reasoning. 693 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir.
1982). The case went to the Supreme Court. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the
Fed. Res. Sys., 104 S. Ct. 2979 (1984).
73. Following the Supreme Court's decision, Bankers Trust discontinued its prior practice of
lending short-term funds to issuers, at or near the rate of the commercial place being placed. Federal
Reserve Board Statement, reprinted in, FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH), 86,270 at p. 90,824 (1984-
85).
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market." The Court noted that the Act contained a flat prohibition on
bank involvement in investment banking activity.7" The Court also
found little evidence to suggest that the Act's prohibitions depended on
the strength of the particular issue or the sophistication of the investor.76
The Court also concluded that commercial paper is a security under Sec-
tions 16 and 21 of the Act, and therefore, subject to the prohibition on
underwriting.77 The Court, however, left open the issue of whether
Bankers Trust's particular activity constituted "underwriting" under
Section 16 or "the business of issuing, underwriting, selling or distribut-
ing" within Section 21.78
On remand, the Federal Reserve Board found Bankers Trust's activi-
ties permissible under the language of Section 16 .7  The Board inter-
preted the Act's underwriting prohibition not to extend to agency
transactions where the bank did not commit any of its funds.80 The
Board then relied on federal securities provisions to distinguish the pro-
hibited underwriting activity from the permissible agency-type
activities."'
The Board found it significant that under federal securities law an un-
derwriting usually would involve a public offering of securities. The
74. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., 104 S. Ct. 2979 (1984).
75. Id. at 2985. "The Act merely reflects Congress' view that those investment banking activi-
ties that it determined to be incompatible with prudent commercial banking ... justify a broad
prohibition". Id at n.6. The Court said Congress rejected a regulatory approach. Id. at 2985.
76. Id. at 2991. The Court said the Act's underwriting prohibition did not take into account
the particular features of an issue. Likewise, the sophistication of the investor was irrelevant. "The
Act's prohibition on underwriting is a flat prohibition that applies to sales to both the knowledgeable
and the naive." Id. at 2991.
77. Id. at 2987.
78. Id. at 2991 n.12. The court of appeals had concluded that commercial paper was not a
security under the Act. 693 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The court of appeals never addressed the
underwriting issue. The Court decided to express no opinion on this matter. 104 S. Ct. at 2991 n.12.
In an order dated October 19, 1984, the district court remanded the case to the Board so that it
might consider the underwriting issue.
79. Federal Reserve Board Statement, reprinted in FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH), 86,270, at
90,823 (1984-85).
80. Id. at 90,825-90,826. The Board said that the Section's phrase "selling such securities...
for the account of, customers" authorized banks to sell securities as agents for their customers. Id.
81. Id. at 90,829-90,833. The board conceded that securities law interpretations were not con-
trolling for the purposes of interpreting the Act. The Board, however, felt securities law interpreta-
tions provided guidance.
The Board said that the Supreme Court had looked to securities law interpretations when it de-
cided that commercial paper was a security for the purposes of the Act. The Board concluded that
the Court's reliance on securities law interpretations in that situation suggested it would be appropri-
ate to rely on these interpretations in defining underwriting. Id. at 90,830.
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Board noted that Bankers Trust only arranged private sales to institu-
tional investors. Also, the commercial paper qualified for exemption
from registration under Section 3(a)(3) of the Securities Act. By analogy
to federal securities law, the Board concluded that the bank's agency ac-
tivity was not part of a public offering, and thus, removed from Glass-
Steagall's underwriting prohibition.82 Finally, the Board said that Bank-
ers Trust's activity was permissible even under the "subtle hazards" anal-
ysis, 8 3 because, placement of commercial paper as an agent was not
"likely" to implicate the concerns that Camp identified.84
The Securities Industry Association challenged the Board's decision in
federal district court.8 The district court held to the contrary-that Sec-
tion 21 prohibited Bankers Trust's commercial paper placement because
the activity constituted an impermissible selling, underwriting, and dis-
tribution of securities.86 The court said that the bank sales of commer-
cial paper on behalf of issuers were within the literal terms of Section 21,
which prohibited banks from "selling" securities.87 The court acknowl-
edged, however, that the Section 21 prohibition did not prohibit activity
which Section 16 permitted.88 Thus it examined whether Bankers
Trust's activity fell within Section 16's permissive phrase.89
The court said that Bankers Trust's activity did not fall within the
"agency" exception of Section 16 because the activity implicated "subtle
hazards", such as promotional pressures and conflicts of interest, which
the Act meant to prevent.9" The Board had concluded that it was "un-
82. Id. at 90,831.
83. Id. at 90,832-90,836.
84. Id. at 90,832. The Board acknowledged that the "subtle hazards" were "possibilities." The
Board, however, said that agency transactions were fundamentally different from those transactions
where a bank acts as a principal and commit its own funds. In agency transactions, the rewards are
small and commensurate with these small rewards, the risks are minimal. Id. at 90,833. For a
criticism of the Board's approach of assessing the "likelihood" of the risks arising, see infra notes 92-
93 and accompanying text.
85. 627 F. Supp. 695 (D.D.C. 1986). The Securities Industry Association contended that the
Board's interpretation of the Act was incorrect as a matter of law and that its ruling must therefore
be set aside.
86. Id. at 711.
87. Id. at 699.
88. Id. "The Securities Industry Association ignores the Supreme Court's observations that
sections 16 and 21 'seek to draw the same line'." Id. The court continued and said the Board's
construction of Section 21, which effectuated the permissive phrase, was reasonable. Id.
89. The court agreed with the Board that Bankers Trust's activities fit within the literal lan-
guage of Section 16. Id. at 701. The court, though, found it necessary to review the Board's "subtle
hazard" analysis. Id. at 704-06.
90. Id. at 706.
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likely" that any danger would result from the bank's activity. The court,
however, ruled that this approach was improper, because the Act sought
to eliminate any potential hazards.91 Thus, according to the court, the
Board's opinion adopted a regulatory approach toward bank securities
activity while the Act demanded a flat prohibition.92
This conclusion could have disposed of the issue. The court, however,
went on to examine Section 21's prohibition on underwriting securities.
The court said that the Board's reliance on federal securities law to inter-
pret the term "underwriting" was misplaced.93 The court distinguished
the policy concerns behind the federal securities laws and Glass-Stea-
gall. 94 The court stated that the federal securities laws were designed to
prevent fraud and protect investors. The Act, on the other hand, seeks to
restore the integrity of the commercial banking system. Because these
purposes differ, the fact that "underwriting" under the Securities Act
usually required a "public offering" was not relevant to interpreting
Glass-Steagall." The court ruled that the Act's underwriting prohibition
applied to public or private offerings of commercial paper.96 The court
found any attempt to superimpose a private placement exemption in the
Act invalid. It believed that the same "subtle hazards" were involved in
the public or private placement of commercial paper.97 The court con-
cluded that Bankers Trust's "best-efforts" or agency-type "underwriting"
activity was invalid under the Section 21 underwriting prohibition. 9
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 99 Writing for the court,
91. Id. The court criticized the Board's approach and labeled it an impermissible "ad hoc anal-
ysis of probabilities and likelihoods.". Id. Furthermore, if the Board found potential hazards in
Bankers Trust's activities, it should have invalidated the activities. Id.
92. Id. According to the court, a regulatory approach was "inconsistent with Congress' desire
to separate as completely as possible commercial and investment banking." Id.
93. See supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of federal securities law
provisions.
94. See supra note 55 and accompanying text for a discussion of these policy concerns.
95. 627 F. Supp. at 709.
96. Id. at 708. The court relied heavily on the Supreme Court's statement that the Act con-
tained a flat prohibition on underwriting. Id.
97. Id. at 709. The court also said that Congress was aware of the different nature of public and
non-public offerings of securities, and it explicitly provided for this distinction in the language of the
Securities Act. On the other hand, Glass-Steagall was silent with respect to the public/private dis-
tinction. "In light of these different statutory structures, the Board's attempt to create an exemption
for non-public distributions where none was provided nor apparently intended, simply cannot be
upheld." Id.
98. Id. at 711.
99. 807 F.2d 1052, 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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Judge Bork stressed that courts must defer to agency interpretations of
Congressional Acts when those interpretations are reasonable."°°  The
court then examined the Board's decision under both the literal language
analysis and the "subtle hazards" analysis.
Under the literal language analysis, the court noted that Section 21 did
not prohibit activity that Section 16 explicitly permitted.10' In examin-
ing the scope of Section 16 the court found that Bankers Trust's agency
activity in the commercial paper market fell within the Section's permis-
sive "selling" phrase.10 2 Furthermore, the court said that examination of
the federal securities law does aid in determining what activity Section 16
permitted. 0 3 The court hypothesized that in Section 16 Congress could
have chosen only to prohibit banks from underwriting public offerings. 4
Thus, the court found that the Board's determination that Bankers
Trust's private placement of commercial paper as the issuer's agent was
within the literal language of Section 16 was reasonable.
After reaching this conclusion, the court somewhat reluctantly applied
the "subtle hazards" analysis.105 The court, agreeing with the board's
100. The court applied the deferential standard of review spelled out in Chevron U.S.A. Inc., v.
NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843-45 (1984) (if Congress' intent cannot be inferred, the reviewing court
must determine if the agency charged with administering the statute has acted reasonably when
"filling in the gap"). Here, Judge Bork said that Congress did not clearly address the question of
whether activities such as those Bankers Trust conducted fell within the Act's prohibitions. Thus,
the reviewing court should only determine whether the Board acted reasonably when "filling in the
gap" under the Act. 807 F.2d at 1056.
See also, Board of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys. v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441, 450 (1947) (Rutledge,
J. concurring). ((The Board's) specialized experience gives (it) an advantage judges cannot possibly
have, not only in dealing with problems raised for (its) discretion by the system's working, but also
in ascertaining the meaning Congress had in mind in prescribing the standards by which (the Board)
should administer it.").
101. 807 F.2d at 1057. See also Board of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys. v. Investment Co.
Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 63 (1981) (Section 21 was not intended to prohibit activity that Section 16
permitted).
102. 807 F.2d at 1058.
103. Id. at 1062-65. "[W]e must consider Congress' understanding of the financial terms used in
one statute is highly relevant to discovering the meaning attached to similar but ambiguous terms in
the other." Id. at 1063. See supra notes 52-63 and accompanying text.
104. 807 F.2d at 1064. "While by no means conclusive, this history offers support for the rea-
sonableness of the Board's view .. " Id.
105. The court examined a recent Supreme Court statement from Board of Governors of the
Fed. Res. Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 106 S. Ct. 681, 689 (1986), where the Court said that
invoking the background policy of the Glass-Steagall Act at the expense of its literal terms did not
take into account legislative compromise. The court noted, however, that all of the Supreme Court's
Glass-Steagall Act cases had considered the "subtle hazards" and background purposes of the Act.
807 F.2d at 1067.
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findings under this analysis, determined that the bank's commercial pa-
per placement did not implicate the "subtle hazards" the Act sought to
eliminate.10 6 Also, the court rejected the district judge's contention that
the Board established an impermissible regulatory framework for evalu-
ating the bank's commercial paper activity. The court stated that the
Act's flat prohibitions did not eliminate the need to examine particular
factual situations to determine on which side of the prohibitory line the
bank activity fell."7 Finally, the court said that the Board could decide
that the realities of a situation made even the potential for conflict "sub-
stantially unlikely." 108
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR EVALUATING BANK PLACEMENT OF
COMMERCIAL PAPER UNDER THE CURRENT
STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
Because commercial paper serves as a vital source of short-term credit
for corporations, 09 courts should permit issuers to take advantage of the
106. 807 F.2d at 1069. The court understood the Supreme Court to say that the banking activity
would be prohibited under the "subtle hazards" analysis only when the activity implicated "each
and every one of the hazards." Id. The court said that one "subtle hazard" may be present, because
some depositors may lose their confidence in the bank. This conclusion, by itself, was not enough to
convince the court that the activity was prohibited. Id.
107. Id. at 1067.
108. Id. "A judgment such as this .... is precisely the kind of exercise of delegated expertise that
deserves our full deference." Id. at 1068.
The day after the ruling, the Board approved an application by Bankers Trust to place commercial
paper as an agent through its commercial leasing subsidiary. This activity was held consistent with
Section 20. The Board noted that commercial paper placement as an agent did not constitute under-
writing or distributing under the Act. While concurring with the Board's order, then Chairman
Paul Volcker urged legislative review and update. "I believe legislation should be adopted promptly
to give straightforward authority for bank holding companies to engage in certain underwriting
activities-underwriting commercial paper, mortgage-backed securities, revenue bonds and mutual
funds-with such protections against conflicts of interest and self-dealing as may be appropriate."
Federal Reserve Board Order, reprinted in FED. BANKING L. REP., (CCH), q 86,770, at 92,138-
92,156 (1987).
Various factions have reacted negatively towards the Board's order. Representative Schumer (R.-
N.Y.) urged the Board to reject any applications from banks who seek to add securities services. He
said that Glass-Steagall's prohibitions were still needed. 19 SEc. REG. L. REP. (BNA) 201 (1987).
Likewise, Securities Industry Association representative Robert Gerard told the Senate Banking
Committee that permitting limited underwriting by banks and bank holding companies would lead
to the demise of the laws enacted in the 1930s. Id. at 169.
Following the D.C. Circuit's decision, the Securities Industry Association filed a petition for certi-
orari with the Supreme Court. The Court declined to review the decision, Securities Indus. Ass'n v.
Board of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., cert. denied, 97 L.Ed.2d 734 (1987). Although the D.C.
Circuit's decision stands, the controversy in this area appears unsettled.
109. See supra notes 9-22 and accompanying text.
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efficient distribution networks that banks can provide. While many com-
mentators have suggested that Congress amend Sections 16 and 21 to
keep pace with the rapidly changing financial markets," ° the Act's
prohibitions, unchanged, could continue to protect depositors and the
banking system.
The debate between the securities and banking industries concerning
bank agency activity in the commercial paper market revolves around
two distinct arguments. The banks have relied on the literal language of
the Act, because their involvement apparently fits within the permissive
language of Section 16.111 The securities industry, on the other hand, has
focused on the policy objectivies of the Act' 12 and argued that the exist-
ence of "potential" conflicts arising from bank placement of commercial
paper should invalidate the bank activity.
In Bankers Trust the federal courts and the Federal Reserve Board
failed to address adequately these two areas of analysis. The Board and
the D.C. Circuit emphasized the permissive language of Section 16, while
generally discounting possible hazards as "unlikely.""1 3 On the other
hand, the district court's broad "subtle hazards" analysis rendered the
permissive literal language of Section 16 nugatory. 1 4 Bankers Trust thus
failed to give substantial guidance to either banks or the securities indus-
try.'15 The courts and the regulatory agency failed to recognize that the
110. See Note, An Alternative to Throwing Stones: A Proposal For the Reform of Glass-Steagall,
52 BROOKLYN L. REV. 281 (1986) (This commentator says that new technology and a heavy regula-
tory system make the current financial services industry much different than that of 1929-1933. The
restrictions of Glass-Steagall place banks at a competitive disadvantage. This, in turn, prevents
improvement of services at lower cost.). Note, Fifty-Two Years After the Glass Steagall Act: Do
Commercial Bank Securities Activities Merit a Second Look, 1984 DET. C.L. REV. 933.
Senate Banking Committee Chairman Jake Garn, (R.-Utah), introduced legislation that would
repeal the Act. This action followed Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan's statement
that commercial banks must be allowed to compete with the securities industry. St. L. Post-Dis-
patch, Nov. 20, 1987, 10D.
But see Comment, Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, 31 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 215 (1986) (The recent number of bank failures suggests the bank-
ing industry may be reaching a crisis stage and stricter legislation may be necessary.); Note, Federal
Regulation of Bank Securities: Will Congress Allow Glass-Steagall To Be Shattered?, 12 J. CONTEMP.
L. 99 (1985) (History will repeat itself in the commercial banking industry if bank regulation is not
more restrictive in the near future.).
111. HUBER, supra note 22, at § 12.03(1).
112. Id.
113. See supra notes 79-84, 99-108, and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 109. Former Chairman Volcker's plea for legislation suggests the current
analytical tools are inadequate.
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literal language and the policy objectives of the Act could blend into a
workable framework for analyzing bank commercial paper activity.
The starting point for analyzing bank commercial paper placement is
Section 16. In considering this section, decision makers should first de-
fine the bank's role before dividing permissible and prohibited conduct
into two broad areas. If a bank actually purchases commercial paper
from an issuer with the intent to resell the issue, its activity falls outside
the permissive phrase in Section 16.116 On the other hand, if a bank
merely acts as an agent for the issuer, its commercial paper placement fits
within the phrase "selling such securities.... for the account of, custom-
ers. '"" 7 The language of section 16 then generally permits banks to act
as agents.
The second step of this analysis requires examining banks' agency ac-
tivity under the policy objectives of the Act. This "subtle hazards" anal-
ysis is the area where decision-makers have uniformly failed. The
legislative history of the Act suggests that certain bank agency commer-
cial paper placement should be prohibited." 8 One way to determine
whether bank activity comports with the purposes of the Act is to ex-
amine the bank's actual function in the transaction." 9 This Note pro-
poses that the Act prohibits bank agency commercial paper placement
that is the functional equivalent of purchasing the issue because the
bank's assumption of a risk or development of an investment banker's
pecuniary interest might implicate the "subtle hazards". 2
In determining whether bank agency activity rises to the level of the
functional equivalency, the following guidelines, while not exhaustive,
116. Section 16 only permits "purchasing and selling such securities . . . for the account of,
customers." 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1988).
117. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1988).
118. Senator Bulkley's remarks advocate "removing risks" and "protecting depositors". 75
CONG. REc. 9911-15 (1932). These purposes manifest themselves in the language of Section 16's
prohibitions. The permissive "selling" phrase in Section 16 reveals that Congress did not envision
similar "hazards" in all agency transactions. It is clear, however, that if substantial risks appear in
an agency transaction, Congress may have intended to invalidate this transaction. See Securities
Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., 807 F.2d at 1069.
119. When examining Bankers Trust's activities in light of the hazards the Act was intended to
prevent, the Board examined investment of bank funds. The Board found that consistency with the
Act required that the banks refrain from activity that would "represent the functional equivalent of
purchasing... commercial paper." Federal Reserve Board Statement, reprinted in FED. BANKING
L. REP. (CCH) 86,270, at 90,833 (1984-85). The Board concluded its opinion by saying its conclu-
sions under the Act may change if the bank "functions ... are materially altered." Id. at 90,836.
120. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "subtle hazards."
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will be nonetheless effective. I"1 If bank agency commercial paper place-
ment conforms with these guidelines, there will be a presumption that:
1) the activity is not the functional equivalent; 2) the "subtle hazards"
are not implicated; and 3) the activity is permitted by Section 16. The
guidelines for bank commercial paper placement include the following:
1) banks may not use depositors' funds to purchase commercial paper for
prospective resale; 122 2) banks may not extend back-up credit to the is-
suer for the purpose of covering the unsold portion of the issue;123 3) the
timing of bank loans to issuers must be independent of the issue-records
demonstrating this independence must be maintained; 124 4) banks must
independently verify the use of issuer proceeds-proceeds must not be
used to repay loans to the agent-bank; 125 5) banks must only offer com-
mercial paper that is exempt from registration under Section 3(a)(3) of
the Securities Act;1 26 6) upon request, banks must disclose the general
121. The Federal Reserve Board had issued commercial paper guidelines in 1980. Policy State-
ment Concerning Sale of Third Party Commercial Paper by State Member Banks, 46 FED. REG. 2933
(1981). These guidelines, however, were issued on the premise that commercial paper was not a
security for the purposes of the Act. These guidelines were ultimately withdrawn after the Board's
Bankers Trust decision on June 7, 1985. Federal Reserve Board Statement, reprinted in FED. BANK-
ING L. REP. (CCH) 86,270, at 90,836 (1984-85).
122. The use of bank funds was identified as the major concern during legislative hearings on the
Act. See supra notes 33 and 66 and accompanying text.
123. By letter dated December 3, 1984, the Board told Bankers Trust that its practice of ex-
tending short-term credit to issuers of commercial paper to cover unsold portions of the issue ap-
peared to be the equivalent of buying the unsold issue with the bank's own funds, an activity that
would appear to be prohibited by the Act. Federal Reserve Board Statement, reprinted in FED.
BANKING L. REP. (CCH), 86,270, at 90,824 (1984-85). By January of 1985, Bankers Trust discon-
tinued this prior practice.
When the substance of a back-up credit transaciton is examined, it is apparent that banks would
be taking risks if the issue is not completely sold.
124. Loans that are not independent of the issue are in substance, back-up lines-of-credit, which
are beyond the scope of these guidelines. Also, these loans suggest partiality in granting credit.
The Board noted that Bankers Trust documented that credit lines extended to issuers were for
special purposes, unconnected with the issue. Id. at 90,834.
125. This use of proceeds would be extremely risky for a bank, because it would probably indi-
cate that the issuer was financially unstable. Id. at 90,835. However, the use of commercial paper
proceeds to repay loans to the agent-bank is not likely to occur in practice. An issuer with financial
problems will receive low ratings and have difficulty in placing commercial paper in the market, even
if it is encouraged by the bank to do so. Presently, at least five independent services rate proposed
commercial paper issues. Unrated or lower-rated paper cannot be sold easily. See Hurley, supra
note 3, at 527-29.
126. Section 3(a)(3) applies to obligations "of a type not ordinarily purchased by the public."
See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. Securities falling under the Section 3(a)(3) exemption
are usually purchased by sophisticated investors rather than by ordinary investors, SOWARDS, Busi-
NESS ORGANIZATIONS-SECURITIES REGULATION, Vol. II, § 3.04(l), n.20 (1984), thus less protec-
tion is required.
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nature of their lending relationship with issuers to potential purchas-
ers;127 7) banks must not make loans to facilitate purchases of commer-
cial paper that the bank handles; 2 ' 8) bank revenue from commercial
paper placement must not exceed five percent of gross revenues; 29 and
9) banks may not place commercial paper with individuals.' l3
Bank agency activity in the commercial paper market within these
guidelines presumably falls short of the functional equivalency threshold.
In turn, there is a presumption that the "subtle hazards" are not impli-
cated. This presumption is rebutted only by other substantial evidence
which indicates that the agency activity is the functional equivalent of
purchasing the issue, assuming a risk, or developing an investment
banker's pecuniary interest. Given these strict guidelines, however, this
burden will be difficult to meet. Conversely, if the bank agency activity
violates these guidelines, there is a presumption that the activity meets
the functional equivalency threshold and the "subtle hazards" have been
implicated. Unless the presumption is rebutted, this agency activity will
violate the Act.
It is clear that Congress intended to separate commercial banking
127. This guideline gives protection to both potential purchasers and bank depositors. It allows
these groups to determine if the bank has such a unique relationship to the issuer that its lending
practices are, in effect, substantially related to the issue of commercial paper.
128. These types of loans signify that the bank has a "salesman's stake" in the issue, This activ-
ity goes beyond merely matching a buyer and a seller. It shows the bank has developed an invest-
ment banker's pecuniary interest. Also, it signifies that the bank has not been impartial or objective
in granting credit (i.e. one of the "subtle hazards"). The Board points out, however, that yields on
commercial paper are often lower than rates charged by banks on loans. Therefore, it is not always
likely that using borrowed funds to purchase commercial paper would be profitable. Federal Re-
serve Board Statement, reprinted in FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) % 86,270, at 90,834 n.39 (1984-
85). When the use of borrowed funds to purchase commercial paper is indeed profitable, it should
not be tolerated.
129. This limit prevents banks from focusing too much of their attention on securities activities.
If this limit is exceeded, a commercial bank will take on characteristics of an investment bank. See
generally supra note 121, Policy Statment Concerning Sale of Third Party Commercial Paper by State
Member Banks, 46 FED. REG. 2933 (1981) (The Board often has drawn lines regarding bank reve-
nues from securities activities.).
130. When the bank's agency activity remains restricted to institutional investors, there is little
likelihood that the bank can take on the form of an investment bank. Institutional investors have the
resources and expertise to make their own judgments about short-term investments. Thus, the bank
will be unable to develop an investment banker's pecuniary interest because the potential investors
will not require extensive counseling on the merits of the commercial paper issue.
In Bankers Trust, the Board found it significant that commercial paper was placed only with
institutional investors. Federal Reserve Board Statement, reprinted in FED. BANKING L. REP.
(CCH) 86,270 at 90,835 (1984-85 Transfer Binder).
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from investment banking and that it rejected a regulatory approach.' 3 1
Judge Bork is correct, however, when he notes that even if the Act con-
tains a prohibitory framework, someone has to decide what types of com-
mercial paper activity is prohibited.132 The literal language test, the
functional equivalency test, and the accompanying guidelines do not at-
tempt to regulate bank agency activity in the commercial paper market.
This approach merely determines on which side of the prohibitory line
the bank activity falls.' 33
V. CONCLUSION
Questions regarding the scope of permissive bank involvement in the
commercial paper market cannot go unanswered. The dramatic growth
in the number of issuers, the amount of commercial paper outstanding
and the number of banks applying for placement approval make the reso-
lution of this issue imperative. 34 Congress had good reasons for prohib-
iting bank commercial paper placement activity that the Act does not
expressly authorize or that implicates legitimate Congressional concerns.
However, limited bank agency activity in the commercial paper market is
authorized. This limited activity will benefit the issuer, the potential in-
vestor, and the bank itself, without harming depositors or the commer-
cial banking industry.
Stuart J. Vogelsmeier
131. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
132. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 807 F.2d at
1069. Section 16 does have a permissive "selling" phrase. These guidelines determine whether bank
activity in the commercial paper market is within this permissive phrase.
133. Members of the banking industry may argue that these guidelines erect an artificial barrier
to market entry for banks that desire to place commercial paper as agents. This author believes the
guidelines are necessary to determine the scope of activity permitted by Section 16. Restricted mar-
ket entry was not a concern of Congress and does not obviate the need to protect depositors. If a
bank's agency activity is not within the guidelines, it is probably too hazardous to undertake.
134. For a discussion of the nature and growth of the commercial paper market, see supra notes
9-22 and accompanying text.
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